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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GLENN BRIGGS,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.
F. W. HESS and ALICE' HESS,
his wife,

Defendants and Appellants

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
On the lOth day of May, 1947, Laura Tree also known
as L. Tree and as L. T. Zitting filed a suit to quiet title in
the District Court of Box Elder County, State of Utah,
(Civil No. 6586, defendant's exhibit No. 1) against one F.
W. Hess and Alice Hess, his wife, and others. On the 8th
day of May, 1948, the said F. W. Hess and Alice Hess, his
wife, executed a warranty deed to Glenn Briggs, the plaintiff and respondent herein, for a valuable consideration.
This deed was duly recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Box Elder County, Utah, on the 28th day of May,
1948, in Book 57 of Deeds at page 364. On November 19th,
1949, the District Court of Box Elder County in the suit re1
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ferred to above, entered a judgment quieting title to the
lands in controversy herein, in Laura Tree also known as
L. Tree and L. 'I'. Zitting, a certified copy of said decree being recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Box
Elder County, Utah, on the 20th day of December, 1949, in
Book 1 of Miscellaneous Deeds, page 357 (see exhibits B
and 1).
That after plaintiff learned that said decree had been
entered, declaring the title of his said grantors, the defendants herein, invalid, that he made demand upon his grantors, the defendants herein, that they repurchase said lands
and make good their warranty. That the defendants failed
to purchase said property and make good their warranty ;
that the plaintiff, in order to protect said property and keep
possession thereof, had to repurchase it from the other
parties and sue the defendants herein for the damage that
he suffered.
The defendant admitted all of the allegations in plaintiff's complaint except paragraphs 6 and 7 and denied these
paragraphs for lack of knowledge. At the hearing and particularly the pre-trial, attorney for defendant (R.25) admitted that the amount claimed paid by plaintiff for the purchase price was correct.
Consequently the only issue raised by the pleadings
was whether or not the defendants failed to clear the title
so as to make good their warranty deed and the amount of
the attorneys fees. The evidence offered before the court
(R.27) showed that Mr. Briggs paid $484.68 to get the title
back and the evidence offered as to reasonable attorneys
2
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:iets \.h.• 00) was ~126.vu. '.i'he u1uy evidence oU:ered 1n rebuttle was the tax deed lH..o~) otfered by lVlr.lVlason and the
tile in the previous case between Hess and Laura Tree,
(R.34) which previous action determined that lVlr. Hess had
no title to the property. There was a discussion about the
pleading (R.35) where the attorney for plaintiff made the
statement to the court, that the Quit Claim Deed from Box
Elder County and the Civil Case No. 6586 of Laura Tree et
al vs. Hess, offered by the defendants, was admitted by
plaintiff for the purpose of showing that the matter had
been litigated and Hess determined to have no title and that
all parties claiming under him were estopped from claiming
their title through him and were not admitted for the purpose of showing any affirmative defense, as none was
pleaded. There was no proof offered by defendants as to
the circumstances under which Hess sold the property to
the plaintiff Briggs, that is, whether or not he knew there
was a suit pending; whether or not he had paid any taxes
since the deed was originally issued to him by the defendant
Hess; and whether or not Briggs claimed to be a bona fide
purchaser for value without knowledge of the suit. On the
11th day of August, 1951, Briggs in order to protect said
property and after notice being given to Hess that he could
not afford to lose said property and would have to repurchase it if Hess did not, purchased the said property and
brought the suit for damage.
STATEMENT OF POINTS:
POINT I. THE MATTER RELIED ON BY DEFENDANTs· IN THIS APPEAL FOR THE FIRST TIME', TO-WIT,
3
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THAT NU LIS PEND~.NS WAS .F1lliV AND '!HAT TH~
PLAINTIFF' IitUGGS WA.S A .BONA .F'1D~ .PU.UCHA~Elt
FOR VALUE, I~ RAISED :F'UR THE }i~RST TllVfE ON APPEAL AND IS AN AFFlHrMATl VE 1J~!i''J£N~.C.: AND lVIUS'l'
BE SPECIALLY PLEADED.

POINT II. T'HAT IF AN AF"'.F''IRMATIVE DEFENSE
COULD BE RAISED NOW, FOR THE FIRST TIME,
WHICH PLAINTIFF DENIES, THEN THE DEFENDANT
IN SAID AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE MUST BEAR THE
BURDEN OF PROVING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS A !BONA
FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE LITIGATION, THEN PENDING AT THE
TIME OF PURCHASE, AND THAT THE DEFENDANT
HAD GOOD TITLE AND THAT THE SAME PASSED
WITH HIS CONVEYANCE.
POINT III. THAT WHEN THE· DISTRICT COURT
IN CIVIL SUIT No. 6586 (DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT No.
1) DECLARED THE TAX TITLE OF F. W. HESS, NULL
AND VOID, THAT HIS WARRANTY OF TITLE THEN
FAILED. THAT ANY GRANTEE OF HESS, WHETHER
HE CLAIMED TO BE A BONA FIDE· PURCHASER OR
NOT WOULD NOT HAVE ANY BETTER TITLE THAN
HESS, AND HESS HAD NONE'. UNDER SUCH GIRCUMSTANCES THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT.
ARGUMENT:
POINT 1. THE· MATTER RELIED ON BY DEFENDANTS IN THIS APPEAL FOR THE FIRST TIME, TOWIT, THAT NO LIS PENDENS WAS FILED AND THAT
4
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THE PLAINTIFF BRIGGS WAS A BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE, IS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL AND IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AND
MUST BE SPECIALLY PLEADED.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8, Sub-paragraph
C, reads as follows :
"Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a precedceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and
award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence,
discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure
of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow
servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations,
waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense."
This Court is invited to review again the pleading (R. 1 to
23) to see if it is possible to construe that an affirmative
defense of this nature has been pleaded. There is nothing
but a general denial of a part of the original complaint.
Plaintiff and Respondent submits that such affirmative matter cannot now be raised for the first time before.
this court.
POINT II. THAT IF AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
COULD BE RAISED NOW, FOR THE: FIRST TIME,
WHICH PLAINTIFF DENIES, THEN THE. DEFENDANT
IN SAID AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE MUST BEAR THE
BURDEN OF PROVING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS A BONA
FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE LITIGATION THEN PENDING AT THE
TIME OF PURCHASE AND THAT THE DEFENDANT
HAD GOOD TITLE AND THAT THE' SAME PASSED
WITH HIS CONVEYANCE.
5
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It is appellant's contention that if no lis pendens was
put on record by the party plaintiff, sueing the present defendant in a previous suit, that then any person so long as
that lis pendens was not on record would be a bona fide purchaser and would be free from the effect of the litigation
then pending before the court. In Thompson on Real Prop.
erty, Volumn 8, Article No. 4510, page 398, we have the
following:

"----. On the other hand, one who purchases
with actual notice of the pendency of a suit affecting the land can not object that statutory notice of
the pendency of the suit was not filed."
The cases cited in support of this are numerous.
Consequently under this great array of decisions, the appellant if he has asserted such affirmative defense must also
prove every step and one is, that even in the absence of a lis
pendens heing filed he must also show that the present
plaintiff, Briggs, had no actual notice of the pendency of the
suit between his grantor and Laura Tree et al. The record
is absolutely silent upon this point. Our section 104-5-16
Utah Cide Annotated 1943 is taken from the California
Civil Code and is practically the same word for word. I refer you at this time to 16. Cal. Jur. page 647 under the general heading of Lis Pendens, and we have,
" ---- . As already intimated, one who with actual notice of the pendency of a suit purchases the
property involved in an action from a party thereto is concluded by a judgment against the party he
derived title from, irrespective of the filing of notice of lis pendens."
Then a copy of the California Code is set out on page 648
of said volume. Utah has followed this same theory and
6
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in the Whittaker vs. Greenwood, 17 Utah, 333, 53 Pacific
736 referred to by appellant, and set out in the foot notes
under our Section 104-5-16, Utah Code Annotated 1943. We
find on page 736,
"----. It does not in any way change rule of law
relating to actual notice thereof nor effect of such
actual notice on parties dealing with or obtaining
possession or title to land in litigation."
In that case the party had actual notice, but claimed the
right to ignore the decision of the court because of failure
to file lis pendens, but the Supreme Court held otherwse.
Under Article 4 of the same foot note of the annotator we
have constructive notice had as a result of filing of notice
of lis pendens, is the equivalent of actual notice. Dupee v.
Salt Lake Valley Loan and Trust Co. 20 U. 103, 57 P. 845,
77 Am. St. Rep. 902. This last case is cited by appellant,
but his quotation falls short of the meat of the decision.
The complete quotation found on page 847 is as follows:

"The object of notice of lis pendens is to keep the
subject of the suit, or res, within the power and
control of the court until judgment or decree shall
be entered, so that courts can give effect to their
judgments, and the public shall have notice of the
pendency of the action. Lis pendens may be defined to be the jurisdiction, power, or control which
courts acquire over property involved in a suit
pending the continuance of the action, and until its
final judgment therein. This constructive notice
of filing the complaint as required by the statute
is equivalent to actual notice."
The facts of the above case are not similar to ours,
their being a partial mortgage foreclosure and the lis pendens being filed and setting said matter out so that anyone
purchasing under the partial foreclosure took title subject
7
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to another and superior lien. They did however say that the
lis pendens is nothing more than a form of constructive
notic-e, equivalent under the law to actual notice.
Appellant contends, page 5 of this brief, that the District Court lost jurisdiction over the :Property because of the
fact that the previous owner, the defendant in this action,
had conveyed the property away while the suit was in litigation. The cases cited to support this doctrine are just
Whittaker vs. Greenwood 53 Pac. 736, Dupee vs. Salt Lake
Valley Loan and Trust Co. 57 Pac. 845 and Doris Trust Co.
vs. Quermback et al133 Pac. 2d 1003. I have searched these
cases carefully and not one of them had the question of
jurisdiction over the subject matter being lost, on account
of failure to file a lis pendens, before the court. The last
case cited by appellent being Doris Trust Co. vs. Quermbach
et al133 Pac. 2nd 1003, in the majority opinion had nothing
whatever to say about a lis pendens and in Justce Wolfe's
concurring opinion on page 1006 he referred to a recorded
notice that had been placed on the record and discussed
whether it could be considered as a purported lis pendens
and determined it could not be. Under appellants theory
any party being sued to determine rights in real property,
could connive with a buyer if no lis pendens had been filed
and defeat the court of its jurisdiction over the subject
matter. I can find nothing in the law that would even intimate such a doctrine and on the contrary I find in 16. Cal.
Jur. page 652 under the heading of Actual Notice, which is
as follows:
"Article 8. Actual Notice.
Actual notice of the pendency of an action is as
effective as constructive notice under the statute.
It is a general rule that notice of facts sufficient
8
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to put one on inquiry is notice of all facts to which
inquiry would lead. The notic·e need not be in writing."
Again we have on page 657 of 16 Cal. Jur. under the title
Operation and Effect:
"Article 12. In General.
Although the old maxim of the civil law from
which the modern doctrine of lis pendens evolved
was phrased in the Latin words "pendente lite nil
innovetur." the doctrine has never been held, in
cases to which it has been applied in California, to
have the effect of rendering conveyances made pendente lite absolutely null and void. It simply holds
the interest of the losing party subservient to the
relief sought by the plaintiff, and charges all persons with constructive notice of the suit and warns
them that any dealings or meddlesome interference with the subject matter of the action during
the pendency thereof will avail them nothing in the
event of a judgment or decree against their grantor. The effect of a lis pendens is to make a subsequent purchaser from a party a mere volunteer,
who takes subject to any judgment that may be
rendered in the action of the pendency of which
notice is given. The purchasers or encumbrancers
pendente lite are bound by the result of the judgment or decree precisely as their grantors are, or
would have been bound. Purchasers pending a
mortgage foreclosure suit, not made parties thereto, are, however, bound by the decree against their
grantors only to the extent of the property described in the complaint, decree and lis pendens."
The case cited by appellant on page 7 of this brief being Alpha Stores Limited et al vs. Nobel et al 135 Pac. 2nd
625, is not in point with the facts in this case, as the plaintiff Alpha Stores Limited et al got their title as an execution purchaser which is an independent sourse of title,
while in the present case the plaintiff and respondent got
9
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his title through the defendant and appellant, and can never
have any better title than his grantor, Hess. When the
court de·clared the tax title of Hess null and void, regardless of whether Briggs had notice of Hess's litigation with
Tree or not, or whether we term him a bona fide purchaser
for value, his title is no better than Hess's was. A suit by
Briggs with Tree can avail Briggs absolutely nothing as he
gets his title from Hess, Hess got his from void tax proceedings and a Court of Jurisdiction has so declared. The
warranty has absolutely failed and Briggs is entitled to his
damage. Defendant further contends that in the prior case
of Laura Tree vs. Hess (page 7 and 8 of his brief), that the
District Court was without jurisdiction to enter its decree
in said matter. He claims the reason is that Laura Tree
had not filed her lis pendens. At the same time in his brief,
he shows that an action was filed by Laura Tree against F.
W. Hess, but at the time the action was filed Hess was
listed as the owner of the property under a tax proceeding
and Tree the owner under a legal chain of title. During
the period while the issues were being formed the defendant
Hess sold the property and did not raise this issue before the
Court during the litigation that followed. The court found
that Hess's tax title was invalid and he now says that his
decree in another matter is void and of no force and effect.
It is in substance and effect a collateral attack, if anything,
on a prior judgment where the parties are not the same.
POINT III. THAT WHEN THE DIST'RICT COURT
IN CIVIL SUIT No. 6586 (DEFENDANT'S EXHIIBIT No.1)
DECLAREU THE TAX TITLE OF F. W. HESS, NULL
AND VOID, THAT HIS WARRANTY OF TITLE THEN
FAILED. THAT ANY GRANTEE OF HESS, WHETHER

10
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HE CLAIMED TO BE A BONA FIDE PURCHASER OR
NOT WOULD NOT HAVE ANY BETTER TITLE THAN
HESS, AND HESS HAD NONE. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
JUDGl\fENT FOR PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT.
The District Court entered its decree (plaintiff's exhibit "B" and defendant's exhibit "1") and did therein declare that the title of the defendants, F. W. Hess and wife,
was void and of no force and effect and that the rights of
any person claiming under him were of no force and effect.
The record further shows that the plaintiff Biggs, if he had
any title, had to obtain the same under the defendants, F.
W. Hess and wife. The Warranty Deed of conveyance
through which Briggs took his pretended title warranted
that Hess was lawfully seized of the premises and that they
had a good right to convey the same; that they guaranteed
the grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet possession
thereof; that the premises are free and clear from all encumbrances and that the grantors, their heirs and personal
representatives will forever warrant and defend the title
thereof in the grantee, his heirs and assigns against all
lawful claims whatsoever, (Utah Code Annotated 78-1-11).
The decree entered by the court, in effect proved the destruction of the warranty made by the defendant Hess.
The first covenant referred to above was the Covenant
of Seisin and the right to convey. Thompson on Real
Property, Volume 7, Article 3687 page 169 reads:
"
A " covenant of seisin" is defined to be "an
assurance to the purchaser that the grantor has the
very estate in quantity and quality which he purports to convey," and extends not only to the land
11
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itself, but also to whatever is properly appurtenant to and passes by the conveyance of the land.
It is a covenant in praesenti, which is broken, if
at all, as soon as made. The covenant of seisin
does not extend to a title already vested in the
grantee but is broken only by a paramount title
existing in a third person. Such covenant, "is,
when broken, a chose in action, not assignable at
common lay, and this rule still obtains" in North
Carolina. In North Dakota, however, by virtue
of statute, the cause of action for breach of a covenant of seisin is capable of assignment. It embraces possession and the right to convey. It is
breached if a good title in fee-simple absolute, with
right of possession, is not in the grantor when the
deed is delivered. It is broken if there is a material deficiency in the quantity of land called for by
the deed. It is broken, also, if the grantor has not
substantially the very estate he under takes to
convey. If he undertakes to convey the whole estate in fee absolutely, the covenant of seisin is of
course broken .if he has no estate ; and it is broken
if there is an outstanding estate in another, such
as the estate of a life tenant; but it is not broken
by the existance of easements or encumbrances
not striking at the technical seisin of the grantee,
and a mortgage or an expectant right of dower does
not affect the covenant. This covenant does ont
extend to a title already existing in the grantee,
but only to title existing in a third person.
This covenant is in legal effect a covenant of
title as well as a covenant of possession, and is
broken unless the grantor's deed vests in the grantee an indefeasible estate in the land conveyed.
The covenant of right to convey is practically
synonymous with the covenant of seisin. This
covenant, like the covenant of seisin, is one in
praesenti and, if broken, the breach occurs at the
moment of its creation, the covenant in effect being that a particular state of things exist at that
time."
Briggs immediately called upon his grantor to make

12
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good his warranty by purchasing from Laura Tree et al
the said property for the benefit of Briggs, the plaintiff.
That notice and demand went unheaded. Briggs, on the
other hand, is entitled to rely upon his warranty and sue
for his damage thus suffered, because of the failure of
Seisin and right to convey has been established by the decree in Tree vs. Hess Supra. On the other hand if he
should have attempted to litigate said matter he must lose
said litigation, as his grantor's title came from a tax title
and had been declared void. His pretended title, having
come from a void tax sale, even if it could be proved that he
was a purchaser for value from Hess, he has no better title
than Hees had and Hess's title originates from a void tax
proceeding. Consequently the court did not err when in
substance and effect it said to Mr. Hess: "You sold proPerty under a written warranty." "Your written warranty
was broken at the time you gave your deed, and was so
proven by the suit brought against you by Mrs. Tree."
"You were given an opportunity to make good the warranty
and you failed." "Your grantee had to pay out $484.68 because your warranty failed and as a consequence your grantee is entitled to his damage."
CONCLUSION:
As a conclusion from the foregoing, plaintiff and
respondent contends under the pleadings and issues under
which said matter was tried, that the judgment should be
confirmed.
1.

2. That any affirmative defense must be specially
pleaded and that the same, having not been pleaded cannot be raised in the Supreme Court for the first time.

13
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3. That the warranty of title by Hess failed when he
issued his deed and the fact was proven when judgment was
entered against him in Civil Suit No. 6586, between Tree
and him and plaintiff and respondent was then entitled to
his damage as determined by the court.
Respectfully Submitted,
WALTER G. MANN
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent
First Security Bank Bldg..
Brigham City, Utah

14
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